Bradley International: The Mid-Size Engine That Could by Arthur W. Wright
SPRING 2007  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY 11
BY ARTHUR W. WRIGHT
A consultant's “idea that the right
kind of airport development can spur
thousands of new jobs in today’s just-
in-time global economy” was the sub-
ject of a Wall Street Journal story on
January 24 of this year (page B10),
under the header “Airports Take Off
As Development Hubs.”  Around
Connecticut, mentioning “thousands
of new jobs” will make a lot of eyes
light up.  Could Bradley International
Airport provide a “development hub”?
And what might the “right kind of air-
port development" look like?  
Bradley is a key feature of the com-
petitive face that the state shows to the
world.  So investments to sustain the
airport’s competitive edge make emi-
nent good sense.  But should
Connecticut go beyond that, perhaps
even sinking major resources into an
“aerotropolis”—the glamorous air-
port/city espoused by some economic-
development advocates—in Windsor
Locks?
AIRPORTS AS ENGINES OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
It was big news when Northwest
Airlines announced last October that
it would add daily nonstop service
from Bradley International to
Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, effective July 1 of this
year.  Then in November, Frontier
Airlines announced that, beginning
March 2007, it would restore direct
service between Denver and New
England—by using Hartford/
Springfield (BDL) instead of Boston,
which the airline abandoned in 2002.
Two points define a line; could the
two announcements mean that
Bradley's fortunes were pointing up?
Quite possibly.  The new services
will add not only new jobs but also
ready access to important world airline
hubs: Denver is year-after-year the 5th
or 6th busiest U.S. airport, by passen-
ger numbers, and Schiphol is part-
nered with DeGaulle (Paris) in the
SkyTeam alliance in Europe.  But both
Northwest and Frontier are counting
on Bradley stealing, er, luring travelers
away from other airports in the vicini-
ty—who as we speak are themselves
laying plans to grab Bradley travelers.
On the freight side, Hartford-
Springfield’s location just off I-91 and
between two major east-west routes (I-
84 and I-90) is a big plus.  But is it a
bigger plus than (say) Worcester enjoys
with its proximity to the I-395/I-
290/I-90 interchange?  Or Manchester
(NH), which is just off I-93 (connect-
ing to I-95 and I-90 in metro Boston)?   
Airports provide travel and trans-
portation services for passengers and
products.  To do that, they need a vari-
ety of employees, from parking atten-
dants and police, to mechanics, bag-
gage handlers and fixed-base opera-
tors, to air traffic controllers and
pilots.  Airports also have to build and
maintain a wide array of infrastruc-
ture, a boon to the construction sector.
And if enough people come regularly
to an airport, they support commercial
activities not directly related to travel
and transportation, such as hotel and
food services, shoppes, and personal
services.
At the same time, airports face
stiff competition, be it from offsite
purveyors of parking, room and board
or books and clothing; from other
modes of moving people or goods
(highway, rail or water); or from other
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airports. The intensity of that compe-
tition depends on out-of-pocket costs
(e.g., for landing fees, warehouse rent,
and surface travel) and the opportuni-
ty costs of time (e.g., for perishables or
pricey professionals).  Both costs
increase with (sub)urban congestion,
affording opportunities in less congest-
ed areas for profitable entry by new air
carriers or freight haulers, and even for
new airport capacity.
So the economic forces that sup-
port the activities, including the
expansion, of airports are both local
and regional in nature.  Growth in
nearby population and production will
spur airport development, but the
causality may run the other
way—especially if the facility is able to
tap into more distant growth nodes or
unmet demands.
But can building airport capacity
ahead of demand, hoping they will
come, succeed as a development strat-
egy?  It may have worked for
Memphis, which Federal Express
chose as its national hub.  But it didn’t
work for Dulles (in exurban
Washington), which sat for years with
excess capacity waiting for metro





0.6% of total national passengers
boarded, sits squarely in the middle of
the “medium” metro range in the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s rating
scheme (enplanements of 0.25-0.99
percent of the U.S. total).  For con-
trast, the three biggest “large” metros
(Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles,
counting all airports) each run 6% or
better of the national total, while
metro New York (including Newark)
boards 3-4% of the total.  Bradley’s
national rank in terms of enplane-
ments has held steady at about 50th
since 2001. 
Total passenger traffic (incoming
and outgoing) at Bradley has tracked
the business cycle for at least the past
two decades.  It shot up in the late
1980s, from about 3.6 million in 1985
to some 5.0 million in 1989, only to
stall out with the onset of the Great
Recession.  (See W.A. McEachern,
page 12 of our Fall 1999 issue, avail-
able at http://cteconomy.uconn.edu.)
Growth resumed in the mid-1990s
with the so-called Clinton boom.
Then Southwest Airlines—pursuing
its highly successful post-deregulation
business plan of shunning high-cost
airports with entrenched “legacy-air-
line” hubs—introduced service at
Bradley in October 1999.  Passenger
travel (inbound plus outbound) shot
up to 7.35 million in 2000—a cool
million passengers above the 1999
level.   The 2001-2003 recession took
much of the bloom off the Southwest
rose, and total traffic finally reattained
the 2000 level only in 2005, before
slipping back below 7 million passen-
gers again in 2006.
The first chart sets Bradley in the
national context for 1998-2006.  (The
data are for enplanements only, to per-
mit national comparisons; deplane-
ments roughly equal enplanements, so
total passenger traffic is roughly twice
the data shown.)  Converting the data
to growth rates, passenger boardings at
Bradley grew faster than the national
rate for 1998-2000; the rate declined
more than nationally during the post-
2000 slump (a period that included
the side-effects of 9/11); and they out-
paced the U.S. total again for 2003-
2005.
The 1998-2000 period, of course,
coincided with the introduction of
Southwest service at Bradley (October
1999).  The airport’s overall U.S. rank
in passenger traffic jumped from 45th
in 1999 to 41st in 2000, suggesting
that additional travelers from some-
where were trying out the new service.
One statistic underlines the impor-
tance of attracting and retaining
Southwest service at Bradley: The air-
line’s passenger total for 2006, 1.4 mil-
lion (20.4% of the total, second only
to Delta at 23.6% and nearly twice US
Airways’ share), is roughly equal to the
difference between average total pas-
senger traffic since Southwest came in,
2000-2006, and the average for the
five prior years, 1995-1999 (U.S.
Bureau of Transportation Statistics or
BTS, Transtats).
Bradley’s activity in air freight
(measured by weight, not value, and
including both cargo-only shipments
and “belly freight” carried by passenger
planes) has also fluctuated some with
the business cycle, though the second
chart suggests that the national air
freight data exhibit a relatively small
cyclical component.  (One may be for-
given for thinking that last point odd,
given the vagaries of the available air
freight data.  Data on the value of air
freight are lacking altogether, and
those by weight suffer from gross
inconsistencies over time and space.)
One interesting difference from
passenger traffic is that Hartford-
Springfield “imports” more freight, by
weight, than it “exports”; the “deficit”
rose from 7% in 1998 to as much as
16% (in 2003), before returning to
7% in 2006.  This “freight deficit” tells
us mainly that the structure of goods
production in Connecticut uses a rela-
tively large amount (not value) of pur-
chased inputs important enough to
air-freight in.  Of course, the deficit
also means that there is some excess
freight capacity leaving Bradley, which
some added marketing effort might be
able to fill.   
Hartford-Springfield ranks about
tenth among BTS medium “hubs” (a
metro area, not an airline hub with
flight spokes radiating out) in freight
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traffic.  Around the turn of the new
century, Bradley ranked in the high
30s against all hubs nationally, but
BTS data for 2006 placed it 28th—an
encouraging sign of substantial
progress in just a few short years if it
holds up, and if it’s not just a fluke of
the data.  By a different measure used
by the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), which traffics
in planes, not goods—“gross landed
weight” of cargo-only aircraft (exclud-
ing fuel and payload)—Bradley has




Bradley International has hand-
somely exploited the passenger growth
attendant upon airline deregulation,
especially by attracting and so far
retaining the most successful benefici-
ary of that policy change, Southwest
Airlines.  And the airport seems to
have held its own, more or less (insofar
as the available data tell the true story),
in attracting air freight traffic.  The
next question is what Bradley should
do for an encore.
The latest coups in attracting
Frontier back to New England and
persuading Northwest to expand its
service to Amsterdam will extend the
airport’s past success, provided the new
services can attract enough passengers
to support the routes.  Bradley’s facili-
ties and staff must play some role here,
of course.
Congestion costs at Boston’s
Logan Airport likely helped Frontier
Airlines opt to use Bradley for its re-
entry into the region, rather than
resuming service at Logan.  But
Hartford-Springfield is only one of
many regional airports that stand to
benefit from the congestion in Boston.
With the encouragement of Massport,
which operates Logan, once-minor air-
ports in Providence, Worcester and
Manchester (NH) have been upgrad-
ing to win traffic away from Logan; all
three compete with Bradley
(Worcester and Providence are readily
reached from eastern Connecticut, and
Manchester is not that far from central
and northern Massachusetts).  And
according to a 2005 study by the
Connecticut Department of Economic
and Community Development
(DECD), other Bradley competitors
include the Albany, Newburgh, and
Westchester County airports in New
York.
Stewart International Airport in
Newburgh has announced ambitious
expansion plans, with an eye on win-
ning air traffic from Fairfield County,
Connecticut.  Bradley International is
trying to do the same thing, but
Stewart is quite a bit closer—30+ miles
to Danbury, more so to much of the
rest of Fairfield County (Hartford
Courant, February 2, 2007).
Northwest Airlines is banking on
being able to tap into other regional
markets to make its Hartford to
Amsterdam service profitable.
According to a senior Northwest
Airlines executive, “More than any
other new international route that
Northwest has launched, the success of
[the Bradley-Schiphol route] depends
on attracting travelers that today are
driving to other airports” to fly to
northwestern Europe (MarketWatch,
January 5, 2007).  Market research
indicated an average base of 108 pas-
sengers who would choose the new
Bradley service at present, while the
reconfigured Boeing 757s that
Northwest will use on the route will
seat 144 passengers—so upwards of 30
or more additional travelers a day will
be needed to ensure the long-term via-
bility of the route.
The highly competitive environ-
ment just detailed, plus at best modest
prospects for population growth in
Connecticut and neighboring states
(see Steven Lanza’s “Brass Tacks” piece
on that topic, page 17), make it seem
unlikely that Bradley International
could succeed in becoming the first
North American “aerotropolis”.  It’d be
a safe bet that Bradley could not
finance a major expansion on that
scale with revenue bonds sold in finan-
cial markets.  And prudence dictates
that the State avoid any funding or
bond guarantees for such a project as
well.
At the same time, Southwest’s
decision to add service at Bradley back
in 1999, Northwest’s new Amsterdam
service and Frontier’s Denver connec-
tion show that Bradley has significant
potential for opportune, if selective,
expansion.  In all three cases, Bradley
was able to attract the new services
because it had adequate spare capacity,
if not in “move-in” condition, then at
least easily converted.
In today’s economy, maintaining a
credible readiness to house new air
service may well require seemingly
continuous construction and renova-
tion of facilities.  That is quite apart
from the security-related modifica-
tions, still ongoing, that have been
underway ever since 9/11.  So placards
apologizing for “our appearance dur-





















































Source: Bradley International; U.S. DOT, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics. 